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Email :
Phone : (+1) 203-432-3521
Address: Yale Economics Department, P.O. Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268 (USA)
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- How Wasteful is Signaling?, with Alex Frankel, revised September 2026 PDF
- Multi-Sender Disclosure with Costs, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, January 2026 PDF
- Replacement and Reputation, with Elliot Lipnowski and Harry Pei, December 2025 PDFSlides
- Convex Choice, with Andreas Kleiner, revised October 2026 PDFSlides
- Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games, revised March 2026 PDF
- A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012 PDF
- On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007 PDF
- Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin TinnPDFSlides
Earlier incarnations with title "Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections": 2024; 2015 Slides
- Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection, with Weijie ZhongPDFSlides
- Test-Optional Admissions, with Wouter Dessein and Alex FrankelPDFSlides
- The Test-Optional Puzzle, with Wouter Dessein and Alex FrankelPDFSlides
- Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport
- Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social LearningPDFSlides
- Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information, with Nageeb Ali and Andreas KleinerPDFSlides
- Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with Alex FrankelPDFSlides
- Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van WeeldenPDFSlides
- Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:
- Muddled Information, with Alex FrankelSlides
- Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van WeeldenPDFSlides
- Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van WeeldenPDFSlides
- What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with Alex FrankelPDF
- Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
- Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane WoltonSlides
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
- Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin LiuPDFSlides
- Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing SuenPDF
- Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin LiuPDFSlides
- Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew RabinPDF
- Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux
- Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter DesseinPDFSlides
- Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali
- Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier TercieuxPDF
- A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
- Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo CheSlides
- Strategic Communication with Lying CostsSlides
Review of Economic Studies, October 2009
Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk",
the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria"
- Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak HurkensPDF
- Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel
- A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned MoneyPDF
- Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfeeSlides
- Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco SquintaniPDF
Teaching
- Fall 2026: Seminar on Political Economy (Econ 4402); course materials will be at Yale Canvas.
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