Published and Forthcoming Papers

1. Test-Optional Admissions, with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
   American Economic Review, forthcoming Slides VoxEU column
   A related note: A Result on Optimal Deterministic Allocation Rules, with Alex Frankel, October 2023
2. The Test-Optional Puzzle, with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
   AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 2025 Slides
3. Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport
   Review of Economic Studies, October 2024
   An earlier incarnation: Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions Slides
4. Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning
   with SangMok Lee, Tianhao Liu, and Daniel Rappoport
   Econometrica, July 2024 Slides
5. Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information, with Nageeb Ali and Andreas Kleiner
   Econometrica, July 2023 Slides
6. Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with Alex Frankel
   Journal of the European Economic Association, February 2022 Slides
7. Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van Weelden
   American Economic Review, December 2021 Slides
8. Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
   American Economic Review: Insights, June 2021
   An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:

   A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games
9. Muddled Information, with Alex Frankel
   Journal of Political Economy, August 2019 Slides
10. Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van Weelden
    Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2019 Slides
11. Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van Weelden
    Review of Economic Studies, March 2019 Slides Supplementary Appendix
12. What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with Alex Frankel
    Theoretical Economics, May 2018
    An earlier version with a different focus was circulated under the title What Kind of Transparency?
13. Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
    with Alessandra Casella, Luis Sanchez, and Sébastien Turban
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 2018
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
14. Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton
    American Journal of Political Science, October 2017 Slides
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
15. Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
    Journal of Political Economy, October 2017 Slides Supplementary Appendix
16. Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
    RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2017
17. Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
    Review of Economic Studies, July 2016 Slides Supplementary Appendix Clarifications
18. Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster and Andrea Galeotti and Matthew Rabin
    Games and Economic Behavior, September 2014
19. Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2014 Supplementary Appendix

    An earlier version was circulated under the title "Of Candidates and Character"
20. Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux
    Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014
21. Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein
    American Economic Review, February 2013 Slides Supplementary Appendix
22. Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali
    Economic Theory, November 2012

    Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections" Slides
23. Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux
    Theoretical Economics, May 2012 Slides v1 Slides v2
24. A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
    Economics Letters, May 2011
25. Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che
    Journal of Political Economy, October 2009 Slides Supplementary Appendix
26. Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
    Review of Economic Studies, October 2009 Slides

    Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk",
    the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria"
27. Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens
    Experimental Economics, June 2009 Appendix 1 Appendix 2
28. Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey
    American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008
29. Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel
    Econometrica, January 2008
30. A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money
    Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007

    An earlier version, On Cheap Talk and Burned Money, contains additional results
31. Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee
    American Economic Review, June 2007 Slides Supplementary Appendix Dilbert cartoon
32. Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani
    Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007

July 2025