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Published and Forthcoming Papers

  1. Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse SelectionPDFSlides
    with Weijie Zhong
    Theoretical Economics, January 2026
  2. Test-Optional AdmissionsPDFSlides
    with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
    American Economic Review, September 2025VoxEU column
    A related note: A Result on Optimal Deterministic Allocation Rules, with Alex Frankel, October 2023
  3. The Test-Optional PuzzlePDFSlides
    with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
    AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 2025
  4. Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments
    with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport
    Review of Economic Studies, October 2024
    An earlier incarnation: Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions Slides
  5. Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social LearningPDFSlides
    with SangMok Lee, Tianhao Liu, and Daniel Rappoport
    Econometrica, July 2024
  6. Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete InformationPDFSlides
    with Nageeb Ali and Andreas Kleiner
    Econometrica, July 2023
  7. Improving Information from Manipulable DataPDFSlides
    with Alex Frankel
    Journal of the European Economic Association, February 2022
  8. Delegation in Veto BargainingPDFSlides
    with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van Weelden
    American Economic Review, December 2021
  9. Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
    with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
    American Economic Review: Insights, June 2021
    An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:
    A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games
  10. Muddled InformationSlides
    with Alex Frankel
    Journal of Political Economy, August 2019
  11. Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)AdvantagePDFSlides
    with Richard Van Weelden
    Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2019
  12. Informative Cheap Talk in ElectionsPDFSlides
    with Richard Van Weelden
    Review of Economic Studies, March 2019Supplementary Appendix
  13. What Kind of Central Bank Competence?PDF
    with Alex Frankel
    Theoretical Economics, May 2018
    An earlier version with a different focus was circulated under the title What Kind of Transparency?
  14. Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
    with Alessandra Casella, Luis Sanchez, and Sébastien Turban
    Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 2018
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
  15. Electoral Ambiguity and Political RepresentationSlides
    with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton
    American Journal of Political Science, October 2017
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
  16. Contests for ExperimentationPDFSlides
    with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
    Journal of Political Economy, October 2017Supplementary Appendix
  17. Investment in Concealable Information by Biased ExpertsPDF
    with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
    RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2017
  18. Optimal Contracts for ExperimentationPDFSlides
    with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
    Review of Economic Studies, July 2016Supplementary AppendixClarifications
  19. Congested Observational LearningPDF
    with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew Rabin
    Games and Economic Behavior, September 2014
  20. Candidates, Character, and Corruption
    with Doug Bernheim
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2014Supplementary Appendix
    An earlier version was circulated under the title "Of Candidates and Character"
  21. Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
    with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux
    Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014
  22. Pandering to PersuadePDFSlides
    with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein
    American Economic Review, February 2013Supplementary Appendix
  23. Herding with Collective Preferences
    with Nageeb Ali
    Economic Theory, November 2012
    Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections" Slides
  24. Implementation with EvidencePDF
    with Olivier Tercieux
    Theoretical Economics, May 2012Slides v1Slides v2
  25. A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
    Economics Letters, May 2011
  26. Opinions as IncentivesSlides
    with Yeon-Koo Che
    Journal of Political Economy, October 2009Supplementary Appendix
  27. Strategic Communication with Lying CostsSlides
    Review of Economic Studies, October 2009
    Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk",
    the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria"
  28. Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying AversionPDF
    with Sjaak Hurkens
    Experimental Economics, June 2009Appendix 1Appendix 2
  29. Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees
    with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey
    American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008
  30. Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
    with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel
    Econometrica, January 2008
  31. A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned MoneyPDF
    Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007
    An earlier version, On Cheap Talk and Burned Money, contains additional results
  32. Signaling Character in Electoral CompetitionSlides
    with Preston McAfee
    American Economic Review, June 2007Supplementary AppendixDilbert cartoon
  33. Credulity, Lies, and Costly TalkPDF
    with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani
    Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007