Navin Kartik

Published and Forthcoming Papers

  1. Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse SelectionSlides
  2. Test-Optional AdmissionsSlides
  3. The Test-Optional PuzzleSlides
  4. Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments
  5. Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social LearningSlides
  6. Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete InformationSlides
  7. Improving Information from Manipulable DataSlides
  8. Delegation in Veto BargainingSlides
  9. Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
    An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:
    A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games
  10. Muddled InformationSlides
  11. Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)AdvantageSlides
  12. Informative Cheap Talk in ElectionsSlides
  13. What Kind of Central Bank Competence?
    An earlier version with a different focus was circulated under the title What Kind of Transparency?
  14. Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
  15. Electoral Ambiguity and Political RepresentationSlides
    Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
  16. Contests for ExperimentationSlides
  17. Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts
  18. Optimal Contracts for ExperimentationSlides
  19. Congested Observational Learning
  20. Candidates, Character, and Corruption
  21. Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty
  22. Pandering to PersuadeSlides
  23. Herding with Collective Preferences
  24. Implementation with Evidence
  25. A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
  26. Opinions as IncentivesSlides
  27. Strategic Communication with Lying CostsSlides
  28. Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion
  29. Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees
  30. Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
  31. A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money
  32. Signaling Character in Electoral CompetitionSlides
  33. Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk