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Email :
Phone : (+1) 203-432-3521
Address: Yale Economics Department, P.O. Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268 (USA)
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PhD Students on the job market
- Replacement and Reputation, with Elliot Lipnowski and Harry Pei, December 2025 Slides
- Convex Choice, with Andreas Kleiner, revised February 2025 Slides
- Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games, revised October 2023 Supplementary Excel file
- Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond, revised December 2025
Earlier incarnations with title "Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections": 2024; 2015 Slides
- A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012
- On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007
- Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection, with Weijie Zhong
- Test-Optional Admissions, with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
- The Test-Optional Puzzle, with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
- Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport
- Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning
- Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information, with Nageeb Ali and Andreas Kleiner
- Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with Alex Frankel
- Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van Weelden
- Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:
- Muddled Information, with Alex Frankel
- Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van Weelden
- Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van Weelden
- What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with Alex Frankel
- Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
- Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
- Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
- Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen
- Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu
- Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti and Matthew Rabin
- Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux
- Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein
- Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali
- Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux
- A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
- Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
Review of Economic Studies, October 2009
Slides
Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk",
the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria"
- Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens
- Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree and Thomas Palfrey
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel
- A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money
- Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee
- Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani
Teaching
- Spring 2026: Will be added.
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