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Email :
Phone : (+1) 203-432-3521
Address: Yale Economics Department, P.O. Box 208268, New Haven, CT 06520-8268 (USA)
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PhD Students on the job market
- Replacement and Reputation, with Elliot Lipnowski and Harry Pei, coming soon Slides
- Convex Choice, with Andreas Kleiner, revised February 2025 Slides
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Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games, revised October 2023
Supplementary Excel file
- Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn, revised June 2024 (Old) Slides
- A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012
- On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007
- Lemonade from Lemons: Information Design and Adverse Selection, with Weijie Zhong
- Test-Optional Admissions, with Wouter Dessein and Alex Frankel
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The Test-Optional Puzzle, with
Wouter Dessein and
Alex Frankel
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Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments, with
SangMok Lee and
Daniel Rappoport
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Beyond Unbounded Beliefs: How Preferences and Information Interplay in Social Learning
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Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information, with
Nageeb Ali and
Andreas Kleiner
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Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with
Alex Frankel
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Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with
Andreas Kleiner and
Richard Van Weelden
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Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with
Frances Xu Lee and
Wing Suen
An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application:
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Muddled Information, with
Alex Frankel
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Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with
Richard Van Weelden
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Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with
Richard Van Weelden
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What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with
Alex Frankel
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Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version
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Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with
Richard Van Weelden and
Stephane Wolton
Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version
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Contests for Experimentation, with
Marina Halac and
Qingmin Liu
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Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with
Frances Xu Lee and
Wing Suen
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Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with
Marina Halac and
Qingmin Liu
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Congested Observational Learning, with
Erik Eyster and
Andrea Galeotti and
Matthew Rabin
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Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with
Doug Bernheim
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Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with
Richard Holden and
Olivier Tercieux
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Pandering to Persuade, with
Yeon-Koo Che and
Wouter Dessein
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Herding with Collective Preferences, with
Nageeb Ali
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Implementation with Evidence, with
Olivier Tercieux
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A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria
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Opinions as Incentives, with
Yeon-Koo Che
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Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
Review of Economic Studies, October 2009
Slides
Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk",
the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria"
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Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with
Sjaak Hurkens
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Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with
Nageeb Ali,
Jacob Goeree, and
Thomas Palfrey
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Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with
Ying Chen and
Joel Sobel
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A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money
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Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with
Preston McAfee
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Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with
Marco Ottaviani and
Francesco Squintani
Teaching
- Spring 2026: Will be added.
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